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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The alleged deception of the public gave no basis for relief because
"when an injury is committed against the public, that is not a matter
for complaint by plaintiff." The action for negligent misrepresenta-
tions fell because of failure to allege and prove that the defendants
were under a duty to the plaintiff to act with care and that the plain-
tiff had acted upon the negligent statements to his damage.
The court further demonstrated that relief is available only
through proof of special damages. Following the authorities devel-
oped long before the discovery of the radio, the court went on to
say: "Moreover, with respect to the second and third causes of action,
there are absent appropriate statements of special damage. In the
most general terms, plaintiff has pleaded that defendant's acts and
representations have caused it to lose sales and the opportunities to
develop its business. A disparagement may cause injury to plaintiff
and yet not be actionable. Both as a matter of pleading and proof
there must be a definite showing of specific loss of trade, that is, loss
of specific customers or sales." The plaintiff had a legitimate com-
plaint, but not a legal complaint, a new member had joined the ranks
in the field of damnum absque injuria.
Thirty years ago Dean Pound expressed with optimism a belief
that a way would be found to grant relief in cases which fell short of
the legal concept of unfair competition but which nevertheless resulted
in business losses from negligent statements or misrepresentations.
"In substance the traditional doctrine puts anyone's business at the
mercy of any insolvent malicious defamer who has sufficient imagina-
tion to lay out a skillful campaign of extortion. So long as denial
of relief in such cases rests on no stronger basis than authority our
courts are sure to find a way out." 21 Perhaps thirty years is too
soon in which to expect the courts to find a way, but it is hardly too
soon to restate the optimistic hope; too many have never heard of
the golden rule.
DONAL C. NOONAN.
NEWS-GATHERING AGENCIES AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The Associated Press case I now awaiting final decision by the
United States Supreme Court is a landmark in the history of free-
dom of the press. 2  The issue awaiting final adjudication has been
21 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defaination and Injuries to Personality
(1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 640, 668.
1United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (1943).
2 See CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941), for general
reference on subject of free speech and press. Also see short note: WILSON,
Freedom of the Press in CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1939)
1150-2.
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hotly fought by two groups with contrary opinions. The supporters
of the Associated Press position maintain that any mandatory re-
quirements with respect to changes in the Association's by-laws are
a definite infringement of the right of free press guaranteed by the
First Amendment to the Constitution.3  They resort to the historic
American concept of a free press and claim to be modern disciples
of the Zenger tradition.4
The opposing group claims that, on the contrary, no question
ot the right of a free press is involved, nor is this a question of gov-
ernmental repression such as plagued Zenger, when in the eighteenth
century he criticized the British Colonial Government and was im-
prisoned therefor. The instant case, the supporters of the Govern-
ment's position claim, is merely one, where under the cover of a
vested constitutional right, a press association is attempting to
monopolize 5 the stream of American journalism for its own ends
by cornering the news-gathering market. To permit them to do this,
they say, will result in the diminution and ultimate destruction of
the right of a free press for those who are left without the magic
pale of the Associated Press by its restrictive by-laws and exclusive
privileges.
The Chicago Sun and Washington Times-Herald, in the Spring
3 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. I, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." This right is guaranteed against state
restraint by force of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666, 69 L. ed. 1138, 1145 (1925). Also see DODD,
CASES AND MATERIALS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1942) 482.
4See 1 BEARD AND BEARD, RISE OF AmERICAN CrVILIZATION (1930) 185,
186. Also see 9 CADWALLADER, COLDEN PAPERS (N. Y. Historical Society
Collection 1935) 283-355, 359-434.
The trial took place in New York in 1784, during the administration of
Governor Cosby. This was the first real contest for freedom of the press. It
began with the arrest of Peter Zenger, publisher of the Journal, for assailing
the administration of the provincial governor. The jury defied the trial judge.
and gave the editor his liberty. See Toledo Newspaper Co. et at. v. United
States, 247 U. S. 402, 422, 62 L. ed. 1186 (1918), for a modern counterpart of
the Zenger case. In the foregoing case, Justice Holmes, in a dissenting
opinion, championed a newspaper editor's right to criticize a Federal Districtjudge's decision.
5Justice Swan, dissenting in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 375 (1943), strongly took issue with the charge that the Associated
Press membership provisions tended toward monopoly, and indicated that there
were other large associations to which the rejected apllicant might turn, i.e.,
International News Service, United Press, etc. But Justice Hand rejects this
viewpoint when at 371 he states: "Monopoly is a relative word . . . The
Associated Press is not a monopoly in the sense that it is absolutely necessary
to the conduct of the activity . . . for there are few except the exclusive pos-
session of natural resources without which activity is impossible. Most monop-
olies, like patents, give control over only some means of production for which
there is a substitute." Accord, Fashion Originators Guild of America v.
Federal Trade Comm., 114 F. (2d) 80, 85 (1940).
19451
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of 1943, were rejected from membership in the Associated Press by
a vote of more than two to one. No reason can be assigned for
their exclusion except that they were respectively opposed by the
Chicago Tribune and the Washington Post and Star for competitive
reasons. The by-laws of the Association require a majority vote to
admit new members and when a member objects to admission of a
new journal, the other members by a sort of senatorial courtesy in-
variably refuse to vote in favor of admittance. 6
The Attorney-General's office took up the cudgels for the
Chicago Sun, and filed a formal complaint, in which the Sun joined
as amicus curiae, charging that the following by-laws of the Asso-
ciated Press were arbitrary and severe and in restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts:
1. A prospective member must pay an initiation fee amounting
to ten percent of all back annual assessments which the Asso-
ciated Press received from members in his field, during the
last forty-three years 7 [or three times the current annual
assessment, whichever is greater].8
2. A member must furnish to the Association all news of mem-
ber's district of "spontaneous" origin, i.e, spot news. No mem-
ber shall furnish to any person who is not a member news of
the Association in advance of publication.9
The Government asserts that these by-laws are a contract in
restraint of trade. The Associated Press has answered that the
attempted application of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to this agree-
ment would infringe the fundamental law of the land that no statute
shall be so construed as to abridge the freedom of the press. A free
press, they state, requires that newspapers shall be free to collect and
distribute the news in accordance with principles and standards
established by themselves and they shall be free to choose their asso-
ciates in so doing.10 In this contention they are supported by Frederick
Siebert, Professor of Journalism at the University of Illinois."
Professor Chaffee on the other hand feels that the assertion of liberty
6 Chaffee, The Associated Press Suit and Freedom of the Press, Providence
Journal-Bulletin, April 18, 1943, Sec. VI, p. 1, col. 2.
7Ibid. Professor Chaffee points out that this payment would amount to
over $4700,000 in Chicago and $1,000,000 in New York City. It is turned over
to the rival membership newspaper in the same city for its use and benefit.
Since these provisions can be waived by the rival, it is plain that virtual control
of the admission of a new journal to the Associated Press is held by the
existing member newspaper in the same city.
8 By-Laws, Art. 3 (The bracketed portion was eliminated by the Associated
Press before the case was heard by the Federal District Court).9 By-Laws, Art. 8.
10 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 375-77 (1943).
" Siebert, A Defense of the Associated Press, Providence Journal-Bulletin,
April 18, 1943, Sec. VI, p. 2, cols. 1-5.
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of the press in the Bill of Rights must mean something "much bigger
than the right of some newspapers to deprive other newspapers of
access to a vital channel of information merely because the insiders
get there first. Liberty of the press is not the property of some
newspapers or even of all newspapers 12 . . . in short, liberty of the
press belongs most of all to the readers." 13
Precedents are not wanting which indicate the necessity of some
control over such an instrumentality as the Associated Press. In
1900 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Associated Press,
which then had its headquarters in Chicago, had become a public
utility subject to control in the public interest. The court, through
its majority, said: "The corporation being engaged in a business upon
which a public interest is engrafted . . . it can make no distinction
with respect to persons who wish to purchase information and news
for the purposes of publication, which it was created to furnish." 14
The Associated Press in protest against this decision moved its head-
quarters to New York. In the International News Service v. Asso-
ciated Press case, 15 the Associated Press invoked judicial interference
to prevent the International News Service from using its exclusive
information. Though this relief was granted, Justice Brandeis, in a
dissenting opinion, pointed out that it should have been refused until
Congress had decided what were the proper limits for protection.
He agreed with the Illinois decision, and thought that "news should
be protected against appropriation only if the gatherer assumed the
obligation of supplying it at reasonable rates and without discrimin-
ation to all papers which applied therefor." 16
The case against the Associated Press reduces itself in the last
analysis to two fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Government may prosecute this case under the
authority of the "interstate commerce clause". 17
2. Whether the by-laws of the Associated Press already noted
establish facts adding up to the existence of combination or
monopoly in restraint of interstate commerce so that the
12 Chaffee, supra note 5, at col. 3.
13 See leading case on liberty of press, Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U. S. 233, 80 L. ed. 660 (1936), in which the court said at 668: "The
predominant purpose of the grant of immunity was to preserve an untrammeled
press as a vital source of public information." Accord, Near v. State of Minn.
ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931).
14 Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E.
822 (1900).
is 248 U. S. 215, 63 L. ed. 211 (1918).
16 Id. at 268; accord, Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 488,
65 L. ed. 349 (1921).
17 U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, "Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and Among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."
1945]
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Sherman Anti-Trugt Act ' 8 and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act 19
might be invoked.
As to the first question, there is reason to believe that the United
States Supreme Court will find that the Associated Press, by virtue
of its nation-wide coverage and tremendous economic power, is in
"interstate commerce". The Court so decided in the Associated
Press v. National Labor Relations Board case 20 holding that freedom
of the press did not invalidate an order of the Board forbidding the
Associated Press to discourage employees from joining a labor union.
The Court said that the Associated Press was in interstate commerce
despite the fact that it does not sell news and does not operate for
profit.21 The practical abandonment of the distinction between "di-
rect" and "indirect" effects on interstate commerce 22 and other recent
extensions of the "interstate commerce clause" indicate a trend which
is not likely to be reversed in the adjudication of the instant case.
With respect to the second question, there is some doubt as to
how the Supreme Court will hold, for unless it can be shown that an
organization such as the Associated Press is a public calling requiring
admission of all qualified applicants, it would be difficult to prove
"unreasonable restraint" under the Sherman and Clayton Act. The
federal district court ruling,23 rendered by summary judgment on
affidavits and depositions submitted by both sides but without testi-
mony in open court, found evidence sufficient to render the Sherman
and Clayton Acts operative. The court ruled that the Associated
Press' by-laws relating to the admission of new members and re-
strictions in news transmissions are illegal and in violation of both
Acts and required the Associated Press to incorporate a provision in
its by-laws that no newspaper should be denied membership for
competitive reasons.
24
18 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-2 (1890).
Sec. 1.-Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign Nations, is hereby declared to be illegal .... Every person who shall
make any contract declared by Section 7 of this title to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
Sec. 2.-Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign Nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, ... "
1938 STAT. 730, 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1914).
20301 U. S. 103, 81 L. ed. 953 (1937).
21 Id. at 128.
22 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303
U. S. 453, 82 L. ed. 954 (1938) ; accord, Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 83 L. ed. 126 (1938).
23United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (1943).
24 Id. at 370.
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In declaring illegal the provisions with respect to membership
(Art. 3) and provisions requiring a member to give its own news
and newspicture services to any competing member and forbidding
this information to non-members (Art. 8), the court pointed out that
the latter provision was not invalid in itself, but rather part of an
unlawful combination while the by-laws as to membership (Art. 3)
are in force. While this condition maintains, the court felt justified
in issuing an injunction against enforcement of both articles until
the primary wrong is remedied.2 5. The court asserts the right to
enjoin these practices on the ground that they result in a combination
"unreasonably" 26 restricting interstate commerce, and hence are in
violation of both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. However, if the
by-laws with respect to membership were changed, the court indicated
that the provisions as to news-gathering might not be "unreasonable"
restraints and might therefore be legal. The same reasoning applies
to a Canadian Press "cartel" contract wherein similar restrictions
have been effected between a Canadian affiliate and the Associated
Press. While the court found this arrangement illegal at present,
mutatis mutandis it might not so find.
The court would not attempt to say what conditions for member-
ship should be imposed, but held merely that members in the same
"field" as applicant should not have power to impose or dispense
with any condition of his admission and that the by-laws should
affirmatively declare that possible competition with members in the
same "field" should not be taken into consideration in passing upon
the application.
The crucial problem which the Supreme Court must resolve
and upon which the final decision in this case must turn is one upon
which Justices Hand and Swan differed considerably in the decision
now on appeal. It is the identical problem presented by Justice
Brandeis in the International News Service case and by the Illinois
Court before him in the Inter-Ocean Publishing case upon both of
which we had occasion to comment earlier. 27 Can the business of
the Associated Press be found to be a public calling so that its re-
strictions as to news-gathering and membership can be considered
'.unreasonable" restraints? Justice Swan states, "What then is the
ground for holding the by-law provisions in unreasonable restraint
of trade in news-gathering or newspaper publishing? Solely the
court's view that a news-gathering organization as large and effective
as the Associated Press is enjoying a public calling, and so is tinder
25 Id. at 374.
26 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 106, 55 L. ed. 668
(1911).
27 See notes 14 and 15.
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a duty to admit all qualified applicants on equal terms." 28 Justice
Swan does not find the Associated Press such public calling 29 nor
does he find that the common law makes it such. If the business
of news-gathering is to be cloaked with a public interest,80 he feels
such duty should be imposed by legislative and not judicial fiat.
Justice Hand, however, states, "that argument is flatly contrary to
the well-settled common law of contracts in restraint of trade. Con-
gress has already acted by selecting the standard of the common law
to measure its will. Historically that standard can only be applied by
assessing the public importance of the activity which by hypothesis
has been restricted." 31
Thus the issue is joined and the United States Supreme Court
will shortly render its verdict as to the validity of the foregoing
arguments. Both sides have appealed the district court's decision,
the Associated Press assigning errors in the nature of the evidence
and demanding dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
Government has failed to state a cause of action u2 whereas the
Government is seeking a sterner verdict, particularly with respect to
the Canadian Press "cartel" arrangement of the Associated Press.
83
SEYMOUR LAUNER.
28 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (1943) 373.
20 Id. at 375.
3
oSee O'Connell, Any Bwuiness Can Be Made a Public Utility, Public
Utilities Fortnightly, Aug. 17, 1944, for interesting discussion of changing
concepts of the nature of public callings.
31 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 376 (1943).
32 "A.P. Says Suit Asks Papers Aid Rivals," N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1944,
p. 19, col. 1.
33 As this issue was going to press, the United States Supreme Court in a
5-to-3 decision affirmed in full the opinion of the Federal District Court. The
appeals of both the Associated Press and the Justice Department were rejected.
The majority opinion, written by Associate Justice Hugo L. Black, held
that the lower court had correctly found, "that the by-laws in and of them-
selves were contracts in restraint of commerce in that they contained provi-
sions designed to stifle competition in the newspaper publishing field."
The Supreme Court also upheld the lower court's requirement that the
Associated Press will have to: (1) Revise its by-laws to eliminate provisions
permitting a member to keep a competing newspaper in the same field from
becoming a member for competitiv.e reasons. (2) Suspend exclusive news
contracts with its members and with the Canadian Press until the by-laws have
been changed.
Associate Justice Stanley F. Reed, William 0. Douglas, Wiley B. Rutledge
and Felix Frankfurter concurred in the majority opinion, the latter in a sepa-
rate opinion. Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone and Justices Roberts and Murphy
dissented.
"Court Decides Against the A.P. in Trust Case," N. Y. Herald Tribune,
June 19, 1945, p. 1, col. 6.-Ed.
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